Hastings Law Journal
Volume 18 | Issue 2

Article 10

1-1966

Guardianship: The Power of a Guardian to Make
Gifts of His Ward's Property
Paul N. Daigle

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Paul N. Daigle, Guardianship: The Power of a Guardian to Make Gifts of His Ward's Property, 18 Hastings L.J. 415 (1966).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol18/iss2/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

NOTES
GUARDIANSHIP: THE POWER OF A GUARDIAN
TO MAKE GIFTS OF HIS WARD'S PROPERTY
A guardian's ability to dispose of his ward's property is limited by section
1558 of the California Probate Code, which provides in part that:
On the application of the guardian or next of kin of an insane or incompetent
person, the court may direct the guardian to pay and distribute surplus income,
not used for the support and maintenance of the ward, or any part of such surplus
income, to the next of kin whom the ward would, in the judgment of the court,
have aided, if said ward had been of sound mind. The granting of such allowance
and the amounts and proportions thereof shall be discretionary with the court,
but the court shall give consideration to the amount of surplus income available
after due provision has been made for the proper support and maintenance of the
ward, to the circumstances and condition of life to which the ward and said next
of kin have been accustomed and to the amount which the ward would, in the
judgment of the court, have allowed said next of kin, had said ward been of
sound mind... .J
It is not difficult to imagine problems which might arise under the language
of this statute. Three hypothetical, though not unlikely, possibilities will serve
as illustrations:
1. A, a wealthy gentleman of 70, has a son, B, who has deserted his wife
and C, her child by a former marriage. A has paid all the expenses for C's college
education and is about to support C through four years of medical school. A
is declared incompetent and his person and property placed under guardianship.
2. D, an elderly widow with independently wealthy adult children, has given
her second cousin $5000 for each of the past ten years. E, the second cousin, does
not need the money for support, but D has expressed a desire that E have the
money now instead of waiting to take under her will. With this money, E is able
to take a vacation each year which she could not otherwise afford. D is declared
incompetent and her person and property placed under guardianship.
3. F, a millionaire many times over, having no relatives, executes a will
leaving his entire estate to G, a destitute childhood friend with whom F served
in the Army. G, having no income of his own, has been supported by F for the
past twenty years. F is declared incompetent and his person and property are
placed under guardianship.
Now C, E, and G file for an allowance from the surplus income of their
respective incompetent benefactors. A reading of section 1558 will lead to the
inescapable conclusion that neither C, E, nor G will be successful, because none
of them fall within the accepted definition of "next of kin," defined in California
as "those who would be entitled to succeed to the property of a person under
the laws of intestate succession."2 Thus, even though the ward, during compe-

l CAL. PROB. CoDE § 1856 is identical to § 1558, with the exception that the terms
.conservator" and "conservatee" are substituted for the terms "guardian" and "ward" or
"insane or incompetent person:"
2 CAL.PROB. CoDn § 108. "Next of kin" is defined in BLAcx, LAw DicTIoNAny 1194
(4th ed. 1957) as "nearest blood relative."
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tency, had made gifts to, or provided support for, a friend or relative, the
existence of kindred of a nearer degree would exclude a friend or relative from
that class of persons eligible for aid under section 1558. If the courts were to
construe "next of kin," as used in section 1558, to include all-blood relatives, this
inequity would be partially corrected. However, a judicial construction of this sort
would torture the accepted definition of next of kin, and in any event, would
not place a close friend of the ward in any better position than that in which
he now stands. Since it is obvious that a change in the definition of next of kin
is not an adequate solution, an answer must be sought elsewhere.
Even if a petitioner is the ward's next of kin, he may have another obstacle
to overcome before he is granted an allowance. It is not clear from reading the
statute whether the court would grant an allowance to a qualified petitioner where
the only aid such petitioner had received prior to the ward's incompetency had
taken the form of a gift. As a general rule, neither a court nor a guardian has
the power to dispose of the property of the ward by way of gift,3 although in
California an exception to this rule exists in favor of a charity to which the ward
had been contributing prior to his incompetency. 4 Section 1558, as quoted above,
does not specifically prohibit gifts of the ward's property, provided the donee
is the ward's next of kin, but in order for the court to allow them it must be
determined that the word "allowance" includes the term "gifts." Read as a whole,
the statute seems to limit allowances to that amount needed for the support of
the next of kin.5 This reasoning is supported by language in section 1558 which
directs the court to consider the circumstances and condition of life to which the
next of kin had been accustomed. However, the statute also states that: "the
amounts and proportions thereof shall be discretionary with the court, but the
court shall give consideration to . . . the amount which the ward would . . .
have allowed said next of kin."6 The California courts have not discussed a distinction between support and gifts with reference to section 1558,7 and indeed,
it may be a distinction too fine to draw.8 The California cases in point have turned
on whether the ward, if competent, would have granted an allowance.9 Other
courts do, however, discuss the "need" factor in determining what the ward would
have done. 10 In the absence of statute, however, no cases have been found where
a petition for an allowance was denied on grounds that it was not needed for
support. Moreover, in several cases courts have awarded grants of the ward's
surplus income even though it was obvious that the grants were not needed for
3 Harris v. Harris, 57 Cal. 2d 367, 369 P.2d 481 (1962); Guardianship of Hall, 31
Cal. 2d 157, 187 P.2d 396 (1947) (dictum). See generally 39 C.J.S. Guardian & Ward
§ 79 (1944).
4 Guardianship of Hall, 31 Cal. 2d 157, 187 P.2d 396 (1947) (dictum).
5 Harris v. Harris, 57 Cal. 2d 367, 370, 369 P.2d 481, 483 (1962).
6 CAL. PROB. CODE § 1558.
7

Harris v. Harris, 57 Cal. 2d 367, 369 P.2d 481 (1962); Guardianship of Hall,
31 Cal. 2d 157, 187 P.2d 396 (1947); Guardianship of Hudelson, 18 Cal. 2d 401, 115
P.2d 805 (1941).
8
For example, if the petitioner were living at the very edge of poverty and earning

just enough to support himself, would a donation from the ward be a gift or support?
9 See cases cited note 7 supra.
' 0 .See, e.g., In re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W.2d 576 (1943).
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support."1 It seems, therefore, that where there is evidence that the ward, if
competent, would have granted an allowance, the absence of need does not disqualify the petitioner.
Professor William F. Fratcher, in a cogent and scathing attack on the general
rule prohibiting gifts of the ward's property, stated:
One of the cruelest features of the law of guardianship is the rule that the
guardian may not give away the ward's funds, even with court authorization....
A wealthy woman, whose property is under guardianship because of her occasional lapses of memory, may be deprived of the privilege of making regular
contributions to her church and other charities and obliged to see her mother,
her child, or her dearest friend live in poverty and die unnecessarily for the want
of the means to purchase medical care. A retired business man, who had been
making regular annual gifts to his children to minimize the federal estate tax on
stop when senile disabilities result in a guardianship of his
his estate, must
2
property....1

It is conceded that Professor Fratcher's argument is less convincing in California
than in some other states, since section 1558 makes provisions for those persons
mentioned in his argument who qualify as next of kin. However,, if relatives
who do not qualify under the existing statute are mentally substituted for those
who do, the force of his argument is given its full effect.
Are Stringent Restrictions Necessary?

Having established the possibility that severe injustice may result because of
the restrictions set out in section 1558, it becomes necessary to examine the historical basis of the rule to determine whether these restrictions are necessary.
If it can be determined that reasons for these restrictions are invalid or do not
exist, it would seem that a liberalization of section 1558 is justified. "When the
reason of a rule ceases, so should the rule itself."' 8 The law adapts itself to varying conditions 14
and is modified so as to subserve the ends of justice under different
circumstances.
The doctrine that a court may, under proper circumstances, approve grants
to a relative was first stated by Lord Eldon in Ex parte Whitbread:15
I have found instances in which the Court has, in its allowances to the relations of the Lunatic, gone to a further distance than grand-children-to brothers
and other collateral kindred; and if we get to the principle, we find that it is not
because the parties are next of kin to the Lunatic, or, as such, have any right to
an allowance, but because the Court will not refuse to do, for the benefit of the
Lunatic, that which it is probable the Lunatic himself would have done.... 16
11In re du Pont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d 309 (1963); Smith v. Smith, 38 Ohio
L. Abs. 503, 26 Ohio Op. 541 (Franklin County P. Ct. 1942). See also City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan, 43 F. Supp. 790 (W.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd 142 F.2d 599
(2d Cir. 1944), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 323 U.S. 594 (1945).
12 Fratcher, Powers and Duties of Guardians of Property, 45 Iowa L. REv. 264,

(1960).
315-16
1

§ 3510.
See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 Pac. 766 (1903).
152 Meri. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816).
16 Id. at 103, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879. (Emphasis added.)
3 CAL. CiV. CODE

14
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In Whitbread, a niece of the incompetent petitioned for an allowance from
her uncle's estate. It is not clear from the opinion whether the niece was also
the next of kin, but reference is made to the Master's report' 7 which stated, in
essence, that the lunatic's immediate family should be provided for out of the
allowance for the lunatic's maintenance and support, thus implying that kindred
of a nearer degree existed.1 8
The Whitbread doctrine has been used extensively in both England and the
United States to justify grants from the incompetent's estate to persons to whom
the incompetent does not owe a duty of support.1 Courts have, for example,
permitted allowances to the ward's parents, 20 grandchildren, 21 brothers and
sisters,22 brothers and sisters of the half blood,23 nephews and nieces,2 4 cousins,2 5
17Id. at 99, 35 Eng. Rep. at 878.
18 The English rule controlling disposal of the ward's property for purposes not connected with his support is codified in Part VIII, Mental Health Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2,
c. 72, §§ 102-03; "[The judge shall have the power to . . . make orders.., for . . .
the gift of any property . . . for the maintenance or other benefit of members of the
patient's family... and for making provision for other persons or purposes for whom
or which the patient might be expected to provide if he were not mentally disordered ... :'
19 A similar argument, supporting a more liberal conclusion, was made in Note, 43
N.C.L. REv. 616 (1965).
20 Gamble v. Leva, 212 Ala. 155, 102 So. 120 (1924); Ex parte Phillips, 130 Miss.
682, 94 So. 840 (1923); DeWald v. Morris, - Mo. App. -, 397 S.W.2d 738 (1965);
State ex rel. Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo. App. 154, 113 S.W.2d 143 (1938)- Seley v.
Howell, 115 Tex. 583, 285 S.W. 815 (1926); In re Strozyk, 156 Wash. 233, 286 Pac.
646 (1930) (for expenses as guardian). But see Lewis v. Moody, 149 Tenn. 687, 261
S.W. 673 (1924) (statute limited allowances to children or descendants); In re Heek,
225 Wis. 636, 275 N.W. 520 (1937) (statute limited allowances to members of the
family).
21
In re Scehley, 201 Misc. 522, 107 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
22
Farwell v. Commissioner, 38 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1930); In re Buckley's Estate,
330 Mich. 102, 47 N.W.2d 33 (1951); In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288
(Sup. Ct. 1962); In re Battin, 171 Misc. 145, 11 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. 1939); In re
Calasantra, 154 Misc. 493, 278 N.Y. Supp. 263 (Chautauqua County Ct. 1935). An
allowance was denied in Monds v. Dugger, 176 Tenn. 550, 144 S.W.2d 761 (1940),
where23 there was no showing that incompetent would grant an allowance if sane.
In re Farmers' Loan &Trust Co., 181 App. Div. 642, 168 N.Y. Supp. 952 (1918),
curiam, 225 N.Y. 666, 122 N.E. 880 (1919).
aff'd 2per
4
1n re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W.2d 576 (1943); In re Ginsberg,
267 App. Div. 995, 48 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1944); In re Fleming, 173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S.2d
234 (Sup. Ct. 1940); In re Farmers" Loan & Trust Co., 181 App. Div. 642, 168 N.Y.

Supp. 952 (1918), aff'd per curiam, 225 N.Y. 666, 122 N.E. 880 (1919); Hambleton's

Appeal, 102 Pa. 50 (1883); In re Blair, 1 Myl. & C. 300, 40 Eng. Rep. 390 (Ch. 1836).
Allowances were denied in In re Kernochan, 84 Misc. 565, 146 N.Y. Supp. 1026 (Sup.
Ct. 1914) (ward's intent not pioved); In re Johnson, 111 N.J. Eq. 268, 162 At. 96
(1932) (evidence insufficient to show that ward would have granted allowance); Lewis
v. Moody, 149 Tenn. 687, 261 S.W. 673 (1924) (statute limited allowances to children
or descendants).
25
1n re Flagler, 248 N.Y. 415, 162 N.E. 471 (1928) (second cousin); In re Frost,
L.R. 5 Ch. 699 (1870). Applications were denied in In re Darling, 39 Ch. D. 208
(1888) (no evidence of intent); In re Evans, 21 Ch. D. 297 (1882) (no intent).
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friends, 28 and a retired servant.,27 Gifts to charity have been allowed, 28 but are
usually limited to the amount the incompetent had been in the habit of giving.29
In general, the opposition, consent or support3O of the next of kin has no effect
31
on the court's decision.
In recent years, several courts have granted a guardian authority to dispose,
by way of gift, surplus income 2 and portions of the corpus of the estate,83 to
presumptive heirs3 4 or to charities35 in order to reduce estate taxes and thereby
increase the amount the heirs would take when the ward died. These eases placed
great emphasis on findings that the ward, if competent, would have made the
gifts. For example, in In re du Pont, the court said: "I am satisfied that the
guardians have amply proved that the gifts will carry out a plan which he (the
ward) would himself have instituted had be been capable of doing so. Therefore
..

I will authorize the guardians to make the proposed distributions . . . :'as

.

Since there is precedent for awarding grants to persons other than the next
of kin for purposes other than support, and since it has been established that
the existing statute has the potential for producing harmful results, if the policy
considerations which support the restrictions in the existing statute can be refuted,
it would seem that section 1558 should be revised. There are several reasons,
however, which militate against a change in section 1558. First, in California,
any friend or relative may petition the court for a declaration of incompetency.87
The existing language in section 1558, limiting grants to next of kin, could reduce
the probability that a friend or relative, by design, will institute an action to
declare a person incompetent in order to initiate a claim for part of such person's
income. This reasoning, however, overlooks the obvious fact that such person is
unlikely to benefit from having the ward's property placed under the supervision
of the court, for he would still have the burden of showing that the ward, if
competent, would have made such a grant. Indeed, it seems more probable that
2

6Inre Heeney, 2 Barb. Ch.326 (N.Y. 1847).
In re Earl of Carysfort, Craig &P. 76, 41 Eng. Rep. 418 (Ch. 1840).
28 In re Heeney, 2 Barb. Ch.326 (N.Y. 1847).
2
0 See, e.g., Harris v. Harris, 57 Cal. 2d 367, 369 P.2d 481 (1962); Guardianship
of Hall, 31 Cal. 2d 157, 187 P.2d 396 (1947); In re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183,
8 N.W.2d 576 (1943); Citizens' State Bank v. Shanklin, 174 Mo. App. 639, 161 S.W.
341 (1913); In re Stricldand, L.R. 6 Ch. 226 (1871). But see In re Kenan, 262 N.C.
627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964).
80
In re Calasantra, 154 Misc. 493, 278 N.Y. Supp. 263 (Chautauqua County Ct.
1035).
81Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Meri. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816); In re Darling, 39
Ch.D.2 208 (1888).
3 In re du Pont, 41 Del. Ch.300, 194 A.2d 309 (1963); In re Kenan, 262 N.C.
627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964); Smith v. Smith, 38 Ohio L. Abs. 503, 26 Ohio Op. 541
27

(Franklin County P. Ct. 1942).
38 In re du Pont, supra note 32; In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288

(Sup. Ct. 1962); In re Kenan, supra note 32.
4
3 In re du Pont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d 309 (1963); In re Carson, supra note
33; Smith v. Smith, 38 Ohio L. Abs. 503, 26 Ohio Op. 541 (Franklin County P. Ct
1942).
85
Inre Kenan, 262 N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964).
8641 Del. Ch.300, 315, 194 A.2d 309, 317 (1963).
8

7 CAL. PnoB. CODE § 1461.
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a next of kin would bring a spurious action to declare the person incompetentin order to preserve his expectancy in the ward's estate. If the action was successful, the ward could not dissipate his estate and the next of kin's expectancy
could not be defeated by the creation or change of a will. A second possible
reason is that a transfer of incomefrom the ward's estate would be in derogation
of the next of kin's expectancy in the ward's estate. This objection is mooted
where the ward bad executed a will which disregarded the next of kin; here no
reason exists for allowing only the next of kin to receive grants of surplus income.
Even if the ward were intestate, a person other than the next of kin would be
required to come forth with evidence sufficient to show that the ward, if competent, would have aided him. Also, the next of kin does not have a vested interest
in the estate of the ward until such ward's death intestate, so it seems that an
allowance to another would not be in derogation of the interest of the next of.
kin. Finally, it is generally recognized that the court's duty is to supervise the
management of the incompetent's estate and preserve it for the day he regains
his competency. However, since a grant of surplus income would not diminish
the estate, it cannot be said that granting surplus income is incompatible with
the court's duties.
Conversely, there are several reasons which support a change in the statute.
A change would allow the court to give effect to the ward's intentions, thereby
eliminating some of the undesirable-consequences of his incompetency. In some
cases, an allowance would prevent a donee from becoming a public charge,
thereby benefitting the community by removing a burden which it would otherwise have to bear. In addition, an exception to section 1558 already exists in
favor of charities3 8 It seems that the reason for this exception is the favored position which charities occupy in the eyes of the law. Although it is not within the
scope of this note to explore the reasoning behind the favored position of a
charity in this particular situation, it could be reasonably argued that since the
charity will use the grant to benefit others, the ward should be permitted to
benefit others directly. Finally, tax savings may result which would benefit both
the donor and the donee 5 9
While section 1558 is supported by policy considerations, it is submitted that
these considerations are outweighed by policies which favor elimination of the
"next of kin" provision. The word "person" should be substituted for "next of kin"
in section 1558, thereby meeting the objections discussed above. In deciding
whether to authorize grants of the ward's surplus income under such a revised
statute, a court should consider the past conduct of the ward, 40 the ward's present
41
and future maintenance requirements (considering age and life expectancy),
aSHarris v. Harris, 57 Cal. 2d 367, 369 P.2d 481 (1962); Guardianship of Hall,
31 Cal. 2d 157, 187 P.2d 396 (1947).
39 See, e.g., In re du Pont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d 309 (1963); In re Kenan,
262 N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964).
40 A court could possibly use a liberal subjective standard as proposed in Comment,
17 CAxn. L. 1Ev. 175 (1929). '!Determine what had been the past course of conduct
of this particular lunatic, and on the basis" of such facts determine what it is probable
that he, or she, would do in this particular instance." Id. at 178.
41
See, e.g., cases cited note 32 supra.
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existing wills or estate plans, 42 the44ward's relationship with the donee, 4s and the
extent of the ward's incompetence.
Section 423 of a proposed revision to the Model Probate Code 45 provides:
"The court will exercise, or direct the exercise of its powers . . . to make gifts
exceeding one year's income of the curatelic property . . . only if satisfied, after
due notice and hearing, that the curatel, if of age, not disabled and present, would
46
do so himself."
Professor Fratcher, commenting on this section, wrote: "ITihe creation of such
authority is necessary if the property of disabled persons is to be protected against
ruinous taxation . . ."47 It would seem, however, that while tax avoidance may
be a worthy objective, tax considerations are important only in so far as they
can be used to determine what the ward would have done. 48 It is possible that
the ward gave no thought to tax planning during his competent period. It does
not follow that the court or guardian should do his estate planning for him.
To the extent that the court's authority is based on the doctrine that the
court should not refuse to do what the incompetent would have done, the need
of the particular person or organization applying for a grant should be considered
only if, and to the same extent as, the ward would have considered need in making
his decision. This conclusion is clearly consistent with the Whitbread doctrine,
as discussed above, and seems to be more acceptable in view of the difficulties
mentioned previously, in distinguishing gifts from support. 4"
One writer, although conceding that most cases do not support his view, has
challenged the doctrine that the court's authority is based on what it finds the
incompetent would have done. 5° After quoting out of context from Ex parte
Whitbread, he states: "ITihe rule probably should have been that the court will
do what it would have been wise and prudent for the incompetent to have
...51 The passage from Whitbread (quoted portions in italics) reads as
done.
follows: "[Tihe Court does not look at the mere legal demands which his wife
and children may have upon him, and which amount, perhaps, to no more than
may keep them from being a burthen (sic) on the parish,-but, considering what
the Lunatic would probably do, and what it would be beneficial to him should
42 See, e.g., In re Kenan, 262 N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964); Smith v. Smith, 38
Ohio L. Abs. 503, 26 Ohio Op. 541 (Franklin County P. Ct. 1942).
43 See, e.g., Guardianship of Hudelson, 18 Cal. 2d 401, 115 P.2d 805 (1941); In re
du Pont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d 309 (1963).
44 See, e.g., In re Kenan, 262 N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964); Smith v. Smith, 38
Ohio L. Abs. 503, 26 Ohio Op. 541 (Franklin County P. Ct. 1942).
45 First Tentative Draft of Revised Part IV, entitled Protection of Persons Under
Disability and Their Property. This is discussed in Fratcher, Uniform Guardianship
Legislation, 64 MicH. L. REv. 983 (1964).

46

Section 401(g) of the First Tentative Draft, Revised Part IV,

MODEL PROBATE

defines "curatel" as "a person who has been adjudged to be disabled."
47 Fratcher, supra note 46, at 1000.
48 See In re Kenan, 262 N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964).

CODE

49

See note 8 supra.

See Note, 43 N.C.L. REv. 616 (1965).
51 Id. at 620.
50
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be done, makes an allowance for them proportioned to his circumstances ... "52
The italicized portion of the above quote, taken out of context, is dubious support
for the proposition that the court will act as it thinks the incompetent should have
acted. Also, it is to be noted that the quote refers to the incompetent's wife and
children, for whom the incompetent has a duty to provide regardless of his status.
It seems clear that the court must act as the ward would have acted and not
as the court thinks he should have acted. The applicant's need, then, is necessarily
considered when the court decides what the ward would have done and should
not be considered by the court a second time in deciding whether to approve
the applicant's petition. Thus, if it is found that the ward would have granted
an allowance or made a gift notwithstanding the applicant's lack of need, then
the court should not consider such lack of need.
In California, allowances are limited to surplus income. Other states have
allowed gifts to be made from the estate itself where it could be shown that the
ward would have made the gifts. 53 In that the estate must be kept intact in order
to provide support for the ward, it seems best that grants be limited to surplus
income. The possibility of fluctuation in the value of the estate is a real one and
fully justifies this restriction. It is noteworthy that in the cases which authorized
gifts from the corpus of the estate, such estates were worth in excess of 100
million dollars apiece. 54
The court, acting for the protection of the interests of the ward, may impose
a condition that the gift or allowance be considered an advancement against the
55
applicant's share of the ward's estate upon the death of the ward. This power
seems desirable in that the court might refuse the application altogether if it
finds the ward would not have made the gift without attaching this condition.
Obviously, if the applicant is not an heir apparent or beneficiary, it would be
useless to apply the condition; the applicant will not benefit from the ward's
death, therefore no legacy exists against which the "advancement" could be
applied.
In spite of the many good reasons for a change in the statute, some will argue
that a change of this nature will "open the door" of the courts to the grasping
hands of greedy friends, relatives and charities, but this age old argument cannot
justify the denial of a remedy for an existing problem. Instead of requiring the
applicant to prove more probably than not that the ward would have granted
56
an allowance, the court can require "clear and convincing" evidence. Since the
proper
it
seems
extended,
been
has
grants
for
class of persons who can apply
that evidence of this magnitude be required when the person applies to the court
for an allowance because the ward would not have been under a duty to grant
the allowance and the applicant would have had no legal right to demand it.
California courts have required that clear and convincing evidence, as opposed
to a slight preponderance of the evidence, be offered, for example, to show that
a deed absolute in form is actually a mortgage 57 and that property acquired after
52

Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Meri. 99, 102, 35 Eng. Rep. 878, 879 (1816). (Emphasis

added.)

53 E.g., In re du Pont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d 309 (1963); In re Kenan, 262
N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964).

Ibid.
Guardianship of Hudelson, 18 Cal. 2d 401, 115 P.2d 805 (1941).
56 See Witkin, CALn oRNiA EVIDENCE § 209 (2d ed. 1966).

54

55
57

See, e.g., Beeler v. American Trust Co., 24 Cal. 2d 1, 147 P.2d 583 (1944).

